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Calendar
November 7-Regular monthly luncheon meeting of the Denver Bar
Association, Chamber of Commerce Dining Room, at 12:15 p.m.
November 8, 15, 22 and 29-Continuation of the Junior Bar Institute
on taxation, D. U. Law Library, 1416 Court P1., Denver, at 8:15 p.m.

Highlights of The 1949 Convention
Some 400 lawyers from throughout the state attended the 51st annual
meeting of the Colorado Bar Association which was held at the Broadmoor
in Colorado Springs October 13-15. At the final banquet on October 15,
which was addressed by Judge Charles E. Clark of the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, James K. Groves of Grand Junction took
over the gavel from retiring president Wm. Hedges Robinson, Jr. of Denver.
The general business session on Saturday afternoon designated Edward
G. Knowles of Denver to be President-Elect for 1950-51, and the following
vice presidents were elected to serve this year with President Groves: senior
vice-president, Judge Alfred Arraj of Springfield; vice-presidents, Albert S.
Isbill of Denver, Hatfield Chilson of Loveland, and Charles A. Petrie of
Montrose.
Judge Clark in his Saturday evening address, as well as Judge Alfred
P. Murrah of the Tenth Circuit, who spoke at the Saturday luncheon, laid
great stress on the long and arduous work required to put judicial tribunals
on a business-like basis. The association demonstrated its appreciation of this
fact most fittingly when President Robinson presented the new annual certificate of merit to Philip S. Van Cise of Denver for his untiring efforts as
chairman of the Judiciary Committee.
Announcement was made that the American Bar Association's award
of merit, presented annually to the state association which has demonstrated
the greatest progress and activity, had been won by the Colorado Bar Association at St. Louis in September. To insure that the abilities of the president who had guided the association to this award would not be lost during the
forthcoming year, and in order always to provide for continuity in administration, the general business session amended the by-laws to provide that a
retiring president shall continue to sit as an ex-officio member of the Board
of Governors for a period of one year.
The convention got underway on Thursday, October 13, with meetings
of the District Judges Association, the County Judges Association, the District. Attorneys Association, the Water Section and the Junior Bar Section.
The district judges concentrated on a consideration of uniformity of sentence
and personality factors in crime, with the discussion being led by Judge Paul
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L. Littler of Grand Junction, Judge Claude C. Coffin of Fort Collins, and
Warden Roy Best of Canon City. Officers elected for the forthcoming year
were Judges Littler, president; Wm. H. Luby, Eagle, vice-president; and
Edward C. Day, Denver, secretary.
The County Judges Association was largely concerned with a discussion
of proposed uniform forms for probate procedure developed by a subcommittee of the Committee on Revision and Standardization of Forms,
headed by John L. Griffith of Denver. There were some areas of disagreement among judges, however, and upon the basis of this the Board of Governors subsequently decided to put over the question recommending adoption
until the mid-winter meeting.
The District Attorneys Association heard a distinguished panel of
speakers including Chief Justice Benjamin C. Hilliard, Deputy Attorneys
Frank A.Wachob and Allen Moore, and FBI Agent Russell Kramer. The
Water Section presented a symposium on "State or Federal Control of Colorado Water" presided over by Section Chairman Malcolm Lindsey of Denver.
The Junior Bar Section elected the following officers for the current
year: Louis I. Hart, of Denver, chairman; Wm. DeSouchet of Alamosa,
vice-president; and Ira E. Tanner of Denver, secretary-treasurer.
The Friday and Saturday Sessions
The Probate, Real Estate and Trust Law Section, which met on Friday
morning, was likewise concerned with the proposed uniform probate forms,
as well as with a variety of other subjects. Real Estate Title Standards Nos.
57-62 were discussed and later adopted at the plenary session Saturday afternoon. Officers of the section for the new year are: Fritz A. Nagel of Denver, chairman; Judge Hubert Glover of Pueblo, vice-chairman; Simon Quiat
of Denver, secretary-treasurer; Judge Wm. E. Buck of Boulder, Thompson
G. Marsh of Denver, John D. Hartman of Fort Collins, Edward C. King
of Boulder, Raphael Moses of Alamosa and Clifford H. Darrow of Glenwood
Springs, members of the council.
On Friday noon, more than a hundred attorneys accepted the invitation
to inspect the Shepard Citations plant and were later guests of the company
for lunch at the El Paso club in Colorado Springs.
With the cooperation of the American Law Institute, an institute on
the legal problems of small corporations was presented Friday afternoon, with
Allin H. Pierce of Chicago, Richard Tull of Denver, and Thomas M. Burgess of Colorado Springs making up the panel of speakers. Taxation came
in for a major share of attention in this discussion, as well as the following
morning when T. Raber Taylor of Denver spoke on "The Lawyer-Client
Relationship and Its Federal Income Tax Effects."
One of the most stimulating presentations of the entire convention was
made on Saturday morning by Sydney H. Grossman, chairman of the Public
Relations committee, speaking on "The Public Relations Program-Where
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Now?" The high point of entertainment for the convention came Friday
night with the presentation of the Law Club show, for which there was
standing room only.
Actions of The Board of Governors
The Board of Governors carried on its deliberations from Thursday
afternoon through Saturday morning, considering, for the most part, the operative detail of the association and the voluminous reports of the various
committees. It approved the petition of the Ninth Judicial District Bar Association to become a constituent affiiliate, separate from the Northwestern
Colorado Bar Association, the jurisdiction of which had previously encompassed that of the new local association. A Patent Law Section of the Colorado Bar Association was established upon petition of various patent lawyer
members. The "Declaration of Policy" developed by the Joint Professions
Committee and the Colorado State Medical Society was adopted as published
in the September issue, 26 DICTA 208.
Another sub-committee of Wm.E. Doyle's Committee for the Revision
and Standardization of Forms, the civil instructions sub-group under Kenneth L. Wormwood, had presented some 14 recommended uniform civil instructions, and these were approved by the board and referred to the District
Judges Association for adoption.
John E. Gorsuch's report as chairman of the Domestic Relations Committee and James S. Henderson's Criminal Law Revision Committee report
both stirred extraordinary interest in the board, and both committees enter
upon a new year with a mandate from the board to make definite recommendations to the next annual meeting as to suggested legislative changes.
To give the membership more time to consider nominations for association officers, the Board of Governors voted to constitute the nominations
committee at least 90 days prior to the convention, and to direct that the
committee act and publish its recommendations at least 30 days in advance
of the annual meeting. It was decided that this change in procedure could
be accomplished within the present structure of the by-laws.

New Officers of El Paso County Bar
Just prior to the state convention, the El Paso County Bar Association
at its annual meeting elected the following new officers: Frederick T. Henry,
president; Funston Clark, vice-president; Fillmore Gibson, secretary; and
Robert H. Anderson, treasurer.
Harold Ward Gardner
DICTA has been negligent in failing to note the passing of one of the
most distinguished members of the Colorado bar, Harold Ward Gardner,
of Golden. Mr. Gardner was president of the First Judicial District Bar
Assocation at the time of his death on July 19, 1949. He was also active
in the work of engineering societies, being one of the few persons in the
nation who actively practiced both the professions of law and civil engineering. The state and federal bar, as well as his own association, sustained a
great loss with his death.
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Another Approach To The Question of New
Standards For Admission to The Bar
By ALLYN

COLE

of the Ninth judicial District Bar

Most reluctantly I again find myself out of harmony with thinking of
the official leaders of the Colorado bar. I am sure this failure to keep in step
is not entirely the result of chronic perversity. Personally, I love these fellows as brothers. But, it seems to me, they constantly think in terms entirely
foreign to traditional concepts of the bar, which have been believed to be
healthfully individualistic and democratic. Regimentation and paternalism
were formerly the ideals of others than lawyers, at least as applied to their
own profession. Either finds basis in the belief in supermen (of whom the
proponent is generally willing to be one) and in whom I have no faith. To
continue the mixture of metaphor, I can neither tune my tin horn to harmonize with the paternal orchestra nor stretch my midget-like legs to step
with the marching regiment. So, while the right to toot as best I may and
to guide my halting step in my own course remains, let me voice opposition
to a proposed program to guide those who, in my opinion, need no guidance,
and to appoint guardians for those of full age. I refer to articles in recent
issues of DICTA proposing new and stringent standards for admission to the bar.
It seems that we, as a bar, are now exercised over the matter of overcrowding of our profession. Of course this concern is not from fear of competition in our field of activity, but purely a philanthropic urge to "protect"
the youth from engaging in an activity which will, of necessity, result in a
shortened belt and break his heart, and to "protect" the public from irreparable damage through faulty advice and representation by this new brood.
Articles on such restrictions are always so prefaced. Yet, I have heard of no
suggestion from the present bar, that the proposed regulation be retroactive.
Nor, have I heard of complaints on the part of new lawyers, nor students of
the law, that other than themselves should shape their lives, or that the world
in general is to blame for their study of law. I have not even heard complaints from the general public concerning our profession which seemed to
differentiate between new members of the bar and those of long standing.
In fact, the new members of the bar seem to bear their hardships with commendable fortitude, and, so far as I can see, the public is quite oblivious to
the fact, if it be a fact, that they are being injured at all by the overcrowded
condition.
In short, we, as older members of the bar, expressly disclaim personal
interest in the situation, and, so far as I know, the other two interested
parties, the new lawyers and the public, have made no complaint. If either
of them do, ready remedy lies in their own hands. The one may follow some
other vocation, and the other may employ legal counsel from among older
lawyers. Could it be possible that the present paternal urge can arise from
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the fear (unconscious, of course) that newer men will "stay in there and
pitch" and that the public will like their vigor in preference to the staid ways
of older men? The suspicion exists. The bar should be above that suspicion.
Restrictions Too Cramping Already
It is my conviction that we may have gone too far already with impediments to the study and the practice of law-that our ever tightening requirements are more calculated towards thinning the ranks than improving
the quality. If not, then why not make regulations retroactive and eliminate
from the profession those whose basic qualifications do not meet requirements,
and make room for the young men and women who have 'em? The plain
fact is, of course, that such procedure would discard many of the ablest
members of the profession. There is no proof that the younger generation
is of different timber than their sires.
Under proposed restrictions, or in fact those we now have, Lincoln
would never have been. allowed to sit at a counsel table, and the Great Emancipator would have spent his life as an unknown woodchopper in the wilderness. His is not an isolated case. Why do we, as a bar, want to impose restrictions on the ambitious youth of today, which many of us could not have
met in our own youth? It is anxiety for his welfare, or the welfare of the
same public we have served faithfully and well, or is there other motive? No
distress signals seem to go up from either group in which present interest is
proclaimed. If a young man or woman thinks he, or she, is a lawyer, let it
be proved in court. And, if he, or she, is a better lawyer than I, let me be
eliminated, though I have been a lawyer all my life. I had that opportunity
with minimum of requirements, and I would not ask more of him, or her.
Changed times may make for greater proved skill for the try, but that is the
office of the bar examination, and not for a chart as to how the skill was
obtained. The important thing, and the only important thing, is that he or
she has it, and not where or how the skill was obtained, or how much time
was consumed in the acquisition.
Bar examinations are not, and necessarily cannot be, a complete measure
or guaranty of ability, but they do set up a reasonably safe standard. Beyond
that, we have no moral right to go. That they are tough enough now is indicated by the results of the last examination in Colorado, when, I believe
eighty-five passed and fifty-two failed. And of these, all had met stiff requirements already before allowed to take the examination. Many good
potential lawyers were doubtlessly eliminated, who ought to be allowed to
try and try again, if ambition supports such effort and further study.
That the profession is already overcrowded is small argument for stifling
the ambition of those who would enter its ranks. The same might with equal,
if not greater, force be urged by farmers and artisans. If they were fewer,
demand would increase their take, it is true, yet we have small regard for such
selfish attitude and decry the restrictions against entering other lines of
endeavor.
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Proposal Would Penalize Those Without "Connections"
By the most recently proposed "plan", even passing the bar examination,
however brilliantly, would give meagre privileges. The older members of the
bar, regardless of competency, and regardless of the probable facts as to lack
of formal education according to the new standards, would still enjoy their
monopoly of appellate and worthwhile cash business, and the apprentice
would, unless possessed of favored circumstance, be kept at starvation's door.
He could not practice on his own, but must be bound out to "an experienced
and approved attorney of his own selection", and even then could not appear
in appellate courts. So, while he could start a lawsuit, he couldn't finish it.
If a client wanted to hire him, he could at the beginning count on hiring one
lawyer to get him into trouble and another to get him out, the second having
the perfect alibi, in case of failure, that the beginner threw the case away at
nisi prius. What a fat chance a young lawyer would have under such circumstances! Then, suppose no "experienced and approved attorney" could be
found to take the poor chap under wing. ("approved" by whom?) Or, who
would fix the terms of the connection? Suppose the poor chap wanted to
practice law in a country town with one, two or three attorneys there who
were perfectly satisfied with the status quo. They want no help and desire no competition other than that already existing. His choice then is to look
to other fields. Nothing else. It must be admitted that such regulations would
prevent overcrowding of the profession, but it is not immediately perceived
how it would help the new lawyer or the public.
Here are the proposed discouragements to prospective "overcrowders"
of the bar. One must take a four year pre-legal course in which he must study
economics and anatomy and several other subjects. At the end of a year of
legal study, he must pass "a comprehensive examination" by the bar examiners.
If he failed here, he is washed up so far as practicing law is concerned. He
would be allowed to continue just for fun if he wanted to, and no matter
how brilliant he later became in the knowledge of the law, he could never
become "learned in the law" as that term is generally applied to the bar.
He might accumulate legal degrees as long as your arm, but having flunked
a freshman examination, he would be permanently disqualified from hanging
out a shingle carrying the sacred label "Attorney at Law". His advice on legal
matters would be "scab" advice and subject him to dire punishment.
Under the proposed plan, only aften ten or twelve years of labor and
a lot of luck and pull, can one become a lawyer, and hope to begin to make
a living at it. Such a plan would go far indeed towards wrecking the profession, would deprive ambition of chance of success except for the favored
few, and deprive the public of legal services which it is hoped is found of
value to it. The legal profession should not become an aristocracy. The bar
can well busy itself with other things. It would do well to smooth the path,
rather than clutter it with obstacles only the rich could hope to overcome.
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Curative Statutes of Colorado Respecting
Titles to Real Estate
By PERCY S. MORRIS,
of the Denver Bar
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article was originally published in the February and March
1939 DICTA. It is now published as revised by Mr. Morris to include new curative
statutes, amendments to old ones and decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court during
the intervening ten years, as well as to include references to pertinent title standards
and to eliminate matter now obsolete. An alphabetical index to the subject-headings
will be printed at the end of the article.

No lawyer likes to turn down a title as unmerchantable. Occasionally
a disappointed owner and would-be seller or a real estate broker may feel
that a lawyer takes a fiendish glee in rejecting a title as unmerchantable, but
this feeling is without any foundation.
The title to real estate, which a lawyer is called upon to examine and
pass upon, is the title that is shown by written instruments of record. Necessarily, therefore, the examination of and passing on the title is a technical
matter of examining these papers which have been filed of record and determining whether they show a title that appears good or whether there are
defects in the title so shown.
The attorney making the examination does so on behalf of a client who
desires to purchase the property or to make a loan upon it. If he passes the
title as good, his labors after completing the examination are comparatively
simple, consisting of writing a brief opinion stating the title is good, subject
of course to such encumbrances, restrictions, tax liens, etc., as may exist,
preparing the necessary papers and closing up the deal. In such case his
client is relieved and satisfied, the owner of the property is likewise and
everyone is happy. But, if the lawyer turns down the title as unmerchantable,
his troubles have just commenced. There follow arguments between him
and the attorney for the seller, the explaining to his client why he feels compelled to reject the title to the property the client is anxious to buy, the
preparation of an opinion setting forth the facts concerning the defect and
the reasons why same render the title unmerchantable, and, perhaps, a session with the seller or the real estate agent, or both. All of this involves a
large amount of time and discussion and conditions which can not be considered enjoyable to the attorney, with no additional compensation to him for
the same. No one is happy.
But a lawyer, of course, can not pass the title because rejecting it would
impose upon him additional time, work and unpleasantness. If he finds in
the title a defect which under the law or under the recognized practice would
render the title unmerchantable, he must reject it. If he does not do so, he
is not true to his client and he subjects himself to the danger of having his
client come back to him in the future because of such title being rejected
by an attorney examining for a prospective purchaser or lender.
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There are various kinds and degrees of defects in titles. It requires an
expert knowledge and a nice sense of discrimination to distinguish between
defects which may be considered as immaterial and of no consequence, on
the one hand, and defects which are substantial, on the other hand. And
a defect which is purely a technical one and which does not mean that the
purported owner of same does not, as a matter of fact, own the property,
nevertheless may render the title unmerchantable on the face of the records.
The foregoing are platitudes but they are an introduction to statements
as to the reasons which have prompted the passage of the various statutes
which, especially during the last twenty-eight years, have from time to time
been passed by the Colorado Legislature to remedy various defects in record
titles and to make titles to real estate more merchantable. From time to time
during such period, groups of lawyers, a substantial portion of whose practice consists of examination of titles, have conferred together, discussed
curative statutes which might be passed, agreed upon their phraseology and
assisted in having them put through the Legislature. They did this in the
interests of the public and, in a sense, against their own selfish interests in
that the passage of a number of these statutes has meant that lawyers would
not be employed to bring suits to quiet title which they would have been
employed to bring had the statutes not been passed.
In selecting defects to be remedied by curative statutes, and in preparing the statutes, there was required a fine sense of balance between matters,
on the one hand, which involved actual substantive rights of which the
owners thereof might be deprived by the legislation, and, on the other hand,
purely technical matters which involved no substantive rights of which the
owners would be deprived by the legislation. It is one thing to prepare
hastily a statute to remedy a certain kind of defect in the title, but it is another
thing altogether to guard against actual interests or property rights being
cut out thereby. Therefore the number of defects in titles which can be
eliminated by legislation without unjustly cutting out actual property rights
is not unlimited.
The legislation which was thus conceived by lawyers or groups of lawyers to remedy technical defects in titles in this manner falls into two classes:
one class consists of those statutes which make certain things appearing of
record prima facie evidence of certain matters; and the other class consists
of those statutes which impose periods of limitation upon the assertion of
rights and claims. It is believed that statutes falling within either of these
two classes are valid and constitutional. Patton on Titles 224-233.
It is not the assumption of the writer in preparing this article that the
lawyers do not know of these curative statutes and that they do not follow
them. On the contrary, the writer knows that the attorneys who examine
titles are familiar with them and follow them. The purpose of this article
is to collect in one place, in an alphabetical arrangement, these various curative statutes which have been passed from time to time over a long period
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and which appear in the statutes in various places, in order to provide a
source of ready reference to which the lawyer can turn to find quickly the

statute he desires, together with an explanation of its purpose.
ABSTRACTS. By 1927 S. L. 600, Sec. 34, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 140,
it is provided that an abstract of title certified by any reputable Colorado
abstracter or abstract company incorporated under the laws of Colorado may
be used to establish prima facie evidence that the chain of title is as shown
by the abstract except as to any of the instruments of conveyance or record
thereof or certified copy thereof which may be offered in evidence, and that
the Court may take judicial notice of the repute of the abstracter, and that
the absence of tax sale certificates from such abstract for any period of time
covered by the abstract shall be prima facie evidence of the payment of taxes
during such period by the party relying upon any chain of title shown by
such abstract. In Hochmuth v. Norton, 90 Colo. 453, 9 Pac. (2d) 1060, it
was held that under this section the abstract of title, when admitted in evidence without limitation, is "prima facie evidence that the chain of title is
as shown thereby." The purpose of this section was to do away with the
previously required laborious task of proving in an action the title of a
litigant by introducing in evidence, one by one, the recorded copy of each
and every instrument making up the chain of title of such litigant from
the very beginning of such chain, necessitating the carrying from the office
of the Recorder to the court room a large number of heavy books, the identification thereof, and testimony with regard thereto of the Recorder or his
Deputy; and also to make simple the proving prima facie of the payment of
taxes for a period of seven years so as to bring the case within the provisions
of 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs. 143 and 144.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. Prior to 1927 the form of acknowledgment set
out in the Colorado statute (1921 Comp. Laws Sec. 4899) was one quite
different from the form used in most of the other states of the Union, particularly in that the Colorado form contained the words "to be his act and
deed for the uses specified therein." Repeatedly, examining attorneys would
find in the title acknowledgments which omitted either the phrase "to be his
act and deed" or the phrase "for the uses specified therein" without the substitution of any equivalent words. It was felt generally by examining attorneys that each of these two separate phrases was a substantial portion of
the statutory form, so that, if either of them was omitted without substitution
of equivalent words, the acknowledgment was a nullity. The omission of
one or the other of these phrases very often occurred because a deed was
prepared, executed and acknowledged in another state upon a form printed
for use in that state and containing not the Colorado form of acknowledgment, but the form of acknowledgment in use in that state. To remedy this
situation, several sections were prepared and adopted in 1927. One of these
(1927 S. L. 585, Sec. 1, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 107; now amended by
1939 S. L. 289-290, 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 40, Sec. 107) provided a very
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short and simple form of acknowledgment which, as to an individual, merely
reads: "The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this............
" thereby
19 ......... by -------------------------------day of ----------------------------omitting the troublesome words "to be his act and deed for the uses specified
therein." Another section (1927 S. L. 587, Sec. 2, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec.
108) provided that, in addition to the officers then empowered to take acknowledgments within or without the United States, instruments may be acknowledged before any notary public having a notarial seal. This was to correct
the condition created by the previous statute (1921 Comp. Laws Sec. 4891 sub.
Third) not having permitted an acknowledgment to be made before a notary
public outside of the United States or its possessions. Another section (1927
S. L. 588, Sec. 4, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 110) provided that all instruments affecting title to real property in this state which shall have been
theretofore executed or should be thereafter executed purporting to have
been acknowledged or proved out of this state before a notary public or other
officer empowered by the laws of this state to take acknowledgments, if the
form of acknowledgment be in substantial compliance with the laws of the
state or territory where taken or in substantial compliance with the requirements of the present statutes of Colorado, shall be deemed prima facie to
have been properly acknowledged or proved before proper officers. This section made good any acknowledgment previously made in a form used in the
state where it was made but not in accordance with the previously prescribed
Colorado form, and also any acknowledgment which had been previously
made if it was substantially in the form prescribed by the present statutes
and was taken by an official authorized by the present statutes to take acknowledgments. By 1947 S. L. 354, Secs. 1 and 2, 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch.
142, Sec. 257 (1) and Ch. 40, Sec. 11 (1), respectively, the short form of
acknowledgment set out in said Sec. 107 was declared to constitute a proper
form of acknowledgment to tax deeds and to the statutory short form of deed
set out in 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 11. Our Supreme Court has held in
Colpitts v. Fastenau, 117 Colo. 594, 192 Pac. (2d) 524, that, even without
this 1947 statute, the short form could properly be used as the acknowledgment to a tax deed.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS BY PERSONS IN ARMED FORCES, ETC. 1943 S. L.
217-218, as amended by 1947 S. L. 354-356, 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 115,
Sec. 3A, contained provisions authorizing acknowledgments in greatly simplified form to be made before commissioned officers of certain ranks in the
armed forces of the United States by members of the armed forces of the
United States, merchant seamen outside the limits of the United States included within the forty-eight states and the District of Columbia, and certain
other persons outside said limits. Each of such statutes contained provisions
validating acknowledgments complying substantially with its provisions, even
though they were made before the effective date of the statute.
,-----.

ACKNOWLEGMENTS
THAN TWENTY YEARS.

OF INSTRUMENTS

REMAINING

OF RECORD MORE

A large number of defects in titles arise through
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defects in the acknowledgments to instruments in the chain of title. In order
to correct these defects arising from defective acknowledgments or total lack
of acknowlegments, where the instruments in question have been of record
for a long time, therewas passed in 1913 (1913 S.L. 319; 1921 Comp. Laws,
Sec. 4906) a statute which, as amended in 1927, appears as 1935 C.S.A.
Ch. 40, Sec. 111 and as amended in 1937 appears as 1937 S. L. 481, 1935
C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 40, Sec. 111. These statutes provided that instruments
affecting title to real property which have remained or shall have remained
of record in the office of the Recorder of the county where the real property
affected is situate for a period of twenty years, although unacknowledged or
not acknowledged according to law, shall be received and may be read in
evidence and the same or the record thereof or a certified copy of the record
thereof shall be received and may be read in evidence without additional
proof of the execution thereof in the same manner and with the same force
and effect as if they had been properly acknowledged and proved according
to law. The 1937 amendment, for the same reasons as are mentioned herein
under the heading Recording a Long Time After Execution of Instrument,
inserted in the statute the words "irrespective of the length of time that may
have elapsed between the date of any such instrument and the date when
same was so recorded. Because of this statute it is unnecessary and useless
for an examining attorney to devote any time to checking the sufficiency in
form of an acknowledgment to an instrument if it has been of record for
twenty years because, even if he finds the acknowledgment defective, such
defect is of no consequence in view of the language of the statute.
ACKNO\VLEDGMENTS-PLACE OF TAKING BY NOTARIES. Prior to 1947, a
notary public had no authority to take an acknowledgment outside the limits
of the county for which he was appointed. Occasionally an attorney has
had to turn down a title because of an acknowledgment which contained in
its venue the name of a county other than the one which appeared on his
seal. And there was no reason why a notary should not be permitted to take
acknowledgments and affidavits anywhere in the state. Why should not a
Denver notary be able to cross the boundary line of the City and County
of Denver and take an acknowledgment in Englewood, Aurora or Lakewood?
Accordingly there was passed 1947 S. L. 678-679, 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch.
113, Sec. 2, which provided that all of the acts which notaries are authorized
to perform may be performed either within the county in which their bond
is filed or within any other county or counties within the state of Colorado.
It further provided that all acknowledgments theretofore taken and all official acts performed by notaries public within the state of Colorado but outside of the county within which their official bond is filed were confirmed
and made valid, if otherwise correct. 1949 S. L. 534 permits the recording
of a copy of the oath and bond of a notary in any county in the state, in
addition to the county of his residence, and authorizes the Recorder of any
county in which it is recorded to issue a certificate of magistracy.
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AFFIDAVITS. Particularly in former years, affidavits were filed for record
in an attempt to fill the gap in a chain of title caused by lack of administration or determination of heirship proceedings or to remedy variances in
names as they appeared in different instruments or to remedy other defects
of the same general nature. This practice was quite common in some of the
smaller communities. However, such affidavits were not admissible in evidence in a suit relating to the title to the property. For reasons similar to
those mentioned in the paragraph entitled "Recitals Prima Facie Evidence",
a statute was passed in 1941 (1941 S. L. 605, Sec. 1; 1935 C.S.A. Suppl.
Ch. 40, Sec. 117 (1)) providing that all statements relating to death, intestacy, heirship, relationship, age, sex, names and identity of persons contained in affidavits which have remained or shall have remained of record for
the period of twenty years in the office of the Recorder of the county where
the real property affected by the facts stated in such affidavit is situated shall
be accepted and received as prima facie evidence of the facts stated in such
affidavits insofar as such facts affect the title to real property. It is to be
noted that no statements which relate to any matters other than those specified in the statute, to-wit: death, intestacy, heirship, relationship, age, sex,
names and identity of persons, can be accepted as prima facie evidence. For
example, a statement in an affidavit that the affiant is the owner of certain
real estate by virtue .of a deed executed and delivered by the owner which
has been destroyed and was never recorded can not be received in evidence
or given any consideration as supporting the claim of title of the affiant, even
though the affidavit has been of record for twenty years.
BUILDING AND USE RESTRICTIONS. Considerable trouble has been encountered by examining attorneys through there appearing in the chain of
title (usually in a deed of conveyance) provisions which not only impose
building and use restrictions but also provide for the forfeiture of the title in
the event that such Iestrictions are violated. An attorney will naturally
hesitate about passing the title for the making of a loan by a client if his
client's lien can be cut out through the title of the owner being forfeited
because of the owner violating the restrictions. Because of this, and for other
reasons, there was passed 1927 S.L. 606, Secs. 46 and 47, 1935 C.S.A. Ch.
40, Secs. 153 and 154, which provide that building restrictions and all restrictions as to the use or occupancy of real property shall be strictly construed and that restrictions which provide for the forfeiture of title to or
an interest in real property because of the violation of the restrictions on
other real property (the parcels of real property being owned by different
persons) shall be construed as applying only to the property embraced in
the restriction and owned by the party on whose property the violation of
the restriction occurred and that no action shall be commenced or maintained
to recover possession of real property or to enforce the terms of any restriction concerning real property or to compel the removal of any building or
improvement because of the violation of any of the terms of any restriction
unless said action is commenced within one year from the date of the viola-
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tion for which the action is sought to be brought or maintained. The limitation contained in Section 154 was held by our Supreme Court to bar an
action to enforce forfeiture of title in Wolf v. Hallenbeck, 109 Colo. 70,
123 Pac. (2d) 412. In Seeger v. Puckett, 115 Colo. 185, 189, 171 Pac. (2d)
415, the Court held that the facts of that case did not bring it within the
operation of Section 154. In 1948, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, and
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, the United States Supreme Court held that
state courts are prohibited by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
from enforcing restrictive covenants and agreements against the ownership
or occupancy of real property by persons of any race. These decisions were
discussed in an article by Wilson P. Walcher in the October 1949 DICTA.
CONSTRUCTION OF CURATIVE STATUTES.
As is seen from a glance
through this article, a large number of the curative statutes mentioned herein
were adopted in 1927 and were in Chapter 150 of the Session Laws of that
year. Section 44 on page 605 thereof, being 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 151,
states that it is the purpose and intention of the 1927 Act to render titles
to real property and every interest therein more secure and marketable and
that it is declared to be the policy in this state that said act and all other acts
and laws concerning or affecting title to real property and every interest
therein and all recorded instruments, decrees and orders of court of record,
including proceedings in the suits wherein such orders or decrees may have
been entered, shall be liberally construed, and with the end in view of rendering such titles absolute and free from technical defects, and so that subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers may rely on the record title, and so
that the record title of the party in possession shall be sustained and not be
defeated by technical or strict construction. That this was the purpose, intention and policy of the Legislature has been recognized and expressly
stated by our Supreme Court in the following four decisions: Birkby v. Wilson, 92 Colo. 281, 285, 19 Pac. (2d) 490, which involved the statutes discussed under the heading "Liens-Extinguishment of"; Federal Farm Mortgage Corporationv. Schmidt, 109 Colo. 467, 473, 126 Pac. (2d) 1036, which
upheld and applied the sections discussed under the heading "Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds"; Wolf v. Hallenbeck, 109 Colo. 70, 73, 123 Pac.
(2d) 412, which applied the statute mentioned under the heading "Building
and Use Restrictions"; and Colpitts v. Fastenau, 117 Colo. 594, 598-599, 192
Pac. (2d) 524, which held to be applicable to tax deeds the short form of
acknowledgment provided by 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 40, Sec. 107 mentioned
under the heading "Acknowledgments".
CONTRACTS OF SALE. See Options to Purchase.
CORPORATE RESOLUTIONS AND MINUTES. Occasionally the showing of
record of action taken by a meeting of the stockholders or of directors of a
corporation is required to supplement or support a conveyance or encumbrance executed by the corporation or to remedy an apparent defect in the
title. A certified copy of the minutes or a portion thereof is not, in and of
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effect, and much less is the copy of it in the records of the Recorder admissible, Therefore the institution and completion of a civil action or of a proceeding to perpetuate testimony was required. Because of this, the Legislature in 1941 passed a statute (1941 S. L. 354-355, 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch.
63, Sec. 22), which made admissible as prima facie evidence a certified copy
of a resolution purporting to have been adopted by a meeting of the board
of directors or of the stockholders of a corporation or of the minutes or a
portion or portions of the minutes of such a meeting, when the same purports to be certified by an officer of such corporation and to have the seal of
such corporation affixed to the certification. It also made admissible as prima
facie evidence the record of such certified copy in the office of the Recorder
of the county in which the real estate affected is situate or a certified copy
of such record, certified by the Recorder, when the certified copy of the
resolution or minutes shall have been filed for record in his office.
CORPORATIONS,

CONVEYANCES

BY.

In 1927 there were passed two sec-

tions relating respectively to execution in the name of a corporation of a
deed before the filing of its incorporation papers and to execution in the
name of a corporation of a deed after expiration of its existence where there
was an attempted renewal or extension of its existence. Such sections are
1927 S.L. 607, Secs. 49 and 50, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs. 156 and 157.
The first of these sections provides that, if at the time of the delivery of a
deed describing the grantee as a corporation, no incorporation papers have
been filed and if thereafter proper incorporation papers shall be filed, the
title to the property shall vest in the grantee as soon as the grantee is incorporated and no other instrument of conveyance shall be required. The second
section provides that where the corporate existence of any corporation shall
expire and there shall be an attempted renewal or extension of its corporate
existence, either within the time provided for by law or thereafter, a conveyance thereafter by such purported corporation shall vest in the grantee the
interest of the former corporation. As to cases where the deeds had been
executed before the time when these sections went into effect, it is provided
in the first of such sections that it shall be conclusively presumed that the
title vested in the incorporators in trust for the grantee and that said incorporators properly conveyed the real property to the grantee when the grantee
was incorporated unless within one year from the time the section went
into effect there shall be filed in the office of the proper Recorder a written
explanation or statement of the transaction signed and acknowledged by the
proper parties. It is provided in the second of said sections that the title or
interest so conveyed shall be presumed to have been properly passed to the
grantee unless an action be brought within one year from the time the section became effective to establish a different result.
DEATH, CERTIFICATES OF. It very often is necessary in order to have a
merchantable title that the death of a person be prima facie shown on the
records. This arises most frequently in cases where property was hold in joint
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tenancy or in cases where a life estate was devised or conveyed. By 1935 C.S.A.
Ch. 78, Sec. 128, a certified copy of the record of the death of one dying
in Colorado made and kept in accordance with Sections 104 to 114 of said
Chapter is made prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. This, however, left the question of whether, if the death occurred outside of Colorado,
a certified copy of the certificate of death issued by the official of the foreign
state would be admissible in evidence in a Colorado court and certainly, if it
was recorded in the office of the Recorder, the copy thereof in the records
of the Recorder would not be admissible in evidence. Therefore in 1927
there was passed a statute (1927 S.L. 591, Sec. 11; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec.
117) providing that a certificate of death issued by a public official (whose
apparent official duties include the keeping of records of death) of any state,
territory, county, parish, district, city, town, village, province, nation or
other governmental agency or subdivision thereof or a copy of any such certificate of death certified by such public official or by the county clerk and
recorder of any county in the State of Colorado in whose office the same or
a certified copy thereof shall have been recorded shall, insofar as the death
may affect any interest in real property, be prima facie evidence of the death
so certified and of the time and place of such death and shall be admissible
in evidence in any court in Colorado, and that such method of proving death
shall not be exclusive. In Title Standard No. 36, it is stated that for the
showing of record of the death of an owner in joint tenancy the recording
of a certificate of death under this statute is sufficient without the recording
of the supplementary affidavit mentioned in 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 92, Secs. I
and 2, but that the supplementary affidavit affords means of establishing
identity in case of variance in names.
DECREES, JUDGMENTS AND OFFICIAL DEEDS. 1927 S.L. 603-604, Secs.
39 and 40, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs. 146 and 147, as amended by 1945 S.L.
272, 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 40, Sec. 146, contain provisions which are probably the most helpful statutory provisions that have ever been passed in
Colorado in the removal of defects in titles which otherwise would require
the titles to be rejected as unmerchantable. Said Section 146 provides that no
action shall be commenced or maintained against a person in possession of
real property to question or to attack the validity of or to set aside upon
any ground or for any reason whatsoever any final decree or final order of
any court of record of this state or any instrument of conveyance, deed, certificate of sale or release executed by any private trustee, successor in trust,
Public Trustee, sheriff, marshal, county treasurer, public officer or officers

or appointee of a court when such document shall be the source of or in aid
of or in explanation of the title or chain of title or right of the party in
possession or any of his predecessors or grantors, insofar as the same may
affect the title or explain any matter connected with the title in reference to
said real property, if such document shall have been recorded and have
remained of record in the office of the Recorder where said real property
is situated for a period of seven years. Said section further provides that
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any and all defects, irregularities, want of service, defective service, lack of
jurisdiction or other grounds of invalidity, nullity or causes or reasons
whereby or wherefore any such document might be set aside or rendered
inoperative must be raised in a suit commenced within said seven-year period
and not thereafter. Said Section 147 provides that persons under legal disability at the time the right of action first accrued and who at the time of
the expiration of the limitation applicable are still under such disability shall
have two years from the expiration of a limitation to commence action and
no action shall be maintained by such persons thereafter. In this connection,
see Limitations-Persons under Disability. Said Section 146 provides that
its provisions shall not apply to any of the following cases: forged documents;
during the pendency of an action commenced prior to the expiration of said
seven-year period to set aside, modify or annul or otherwise affect such
document if notice of such action has been filed as provided by law; when
such document has been by proper order or decree of competent court avoided,
annulled or rendered inoperative; and where the party who brings the action
to question, attack or set aside the validity of such document or his predecessor shall have been deprived of possession within two years of the commencement of the action. The result of these two sections is that where a certified
copy of a decree entered in a suit affecting the title to real estate, whether
it be a foreclosure action or a suit to quiet title or an action for declaratory
judgment or any other character of action affecting the title to real estate,
shall have been of record in the office of the Recorder of the county wherein
the real estate in question is situated for the period of nine years (the seven
years provided by Section 146 plus the two years provided by Section 147)
prior to the time of the examination of the title, and the person in whose
favor such decree was entered or his successors in interest shall be in possession of the property at the time of the examination and for the period of two
years immediately prior thereto, and no notice of pendency of an action to
attack or set aside such decree is shown by the records and no order or decree
affecting or setting aside such decree is shown in the files of the original suit
or by the records in the Recorder's office, then the decree as entered by the
court and the certified copy thereof as set out in the records of the Recorder
can be accepted by the examining attorney as being valid and binding according to the terms and provisions on their face as against those named therein
as defendants and those who have acquired interests from them subsequent
to the filing of the lis pendens or the certified copy of the decree, irrespective
of any defects and irregularities there may be in the securing of service of
summons in such action or in any other proceedings in such action prior to
the entry of the decree. That this is the result of these two sections is made
clear by the decision of our Supreme Court in Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation v. Schmidt, 109 Colo. 467, 126 Pac. (2d) 1036, in which the Court
held that, under 1935 C.S.A., Ch. 40, Secs. 146-151, a title was marketable
even though derived through foreclosure action in which the service of summons was fatally defective. See also Munro v. Eshe, 113 Colo. 19, 29, 156
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Pac. (2d) 700. And the same result follows as to releases of Deeds of Trust
by Public Trustees, and also as to Public Trustees' Deeds, Sheriffs' Deeds,
Special Masters' Deeds, Executors' and Administrators' Deeds, Treasurers'
Deeds and other conveyances, certificates of sale and releases executed by
officials included in the language of the section. A concrete illustration of
the effect of these sections can be cited in the case of Public Trustee's Deeds.
In the article prepared by the writer and published in the November 1936
issue of DICTA entitled "Foreclosure by Sale by Public Trustee of Deeds of
Trust in Colorado", which article was prepared with the idea of furnishing
a guide to attorneys in carrying through foreclosure proceedings by sale by
the Public Trustee, there were set out the various steps and' proceedings
that should be taken in the foreclosure and the manner in which they should
be taken to comply with the statutes and the law. In such article particular
attention was paid to the matter of the notice of the sale that was to be
given. With respect to such notice it was stated that the publication of the
notice of sale and the mailing of such notice are the very heart of the foreclosure proceeding, and that the publication and mailing of the notice of sale
in strict compliance with the provisions of the statute are necessary to confer
power on the Public Trustee to sell the property. However, under said Sections 146 and 147, it is immaterial whether notice of the sale was given in
conformity with the provisions of the statute or not, and whether other proceedings were properly taken in the foreclosure, if the Public Trustee's Deed
shall have been on record for nine years and no notice of pendency of action
to set same aside is shown in the records of the Recorder, and no decree
setting it aside is shown in the records of the Recorder, and the grantee in
such Public Trustee's Deed or his successor in interest shall be in possession
of the property at the time of the examination and shall have been in such
possession for two years immediately prior thereto. With reference to this
matter of possession, our Supreme Court, in Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation v. Schmidt, supra, at pages 474-475, held that the title derived through
the instrument referred to in these sections is marketable if the instrument
has been of record for nine years without an action being commenced to
attack it and if the person claiming under such instrument is in actual possession even though there is no showing as to how long his possession has
existed. The 1945 amendment inserted in said Section 146 the words "county
treasurer" so as to make it clear that the provisions of the statute should apply
specifically to tax deeds. After this was done, Title Standard No. 47 was
issued, based on the sections discussed in this subdivision as so amended,
stating that after a treasurer's deed has been of record for nine years or more
and is the source of title of the party in possession, the title is marketable
without a supporting decree. It must be borne in mind that these sections
operate only to prevent the setting aside of the instruments after the same
shall have remained of record for the specified period, and to make them
good according to their terms and that they do not remedy defects such as
misnomer or omission of necessary parties or error in description of property.
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DEEDS. See also: Corporations, Conveyances by; Decrees, Judgments
and Letters in; Homesteads;
and Official Deeds; Descriptions -Numbers
Names, Variances in; Official Sales; Recitals Prima Facie Evidence; Recording
a Long Time after Execution of Instrument; Seals; Signatures of those Acting in Representative Capacity; Trustees; Unrecorded Instruments Against
Whom Invalid; Wills-Powers of Sale under; and the various subdivisions
herein relating to Acknowledgments and Estates and Joint Tenancy.
DESCRIPTIONS-NUMBERS AND LETTERS IN. There is authority for the
holding that the words "Lots numbered 1 to 10", without the addition of
the word "inclusive", convey only the lots to but not including 10 and therefore such a description conveys only lots numbered 1 to 9, inclusive, and does
not convey lot numbered 10. Many titles were rejected because of the omission of the word "inclusive". Feeling that when a grantor executes a deed
conveying "lots numbered 1 to 10" he intends to convey all ten lots, irrespective of what the technical interpretation given to same might be, there
was passed in 1927 a section (19.27 S. L. 593, Sec. 15; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40,
Sec. 121) providing that all instruments wherein the parcels of property
affected are not separately enumerated or listed, but are described as being
from one numbered, lettered or designated parcel to another, shall be construed as including the first and last designated parcels, and also the intervening parcels, unless a contrary intention be expressly and clearly set forth
in the instrument.
ESTATES-CLAIMS NOT FILED WITHIN THE SIX MONTHS. Until 1949.
the statute (1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 176, Sec. 195) provided that all demands not filed within the prescribed period shall be forever barred unless
such creditor shall find other estate of the deceased not inventoried or accounted for by the executor or administrator, in which case his claim shall
be paid pro rata out of such subsequently discovered estate, saving however.
persons of unsound mind or minors, the term of one year after their respective disabilities be removed. Because of this, if a piece of real estate was
overlooked in the administration proceedings and was not included in the
inventory, it continued to be subject to claims against the estate which had
not been filed during the original period of administration of the estate but
which might be asserted long after the closing of such original proceedings.
There was no period after the expiration of which an attorney could positively say that no such claim could be asserted against the property. While
the general statute of limitations might operate to bar the claim, there were
a number of conditions under which the claim would not be barred, even
at the expiration of twenty years from the date of death. For example, the
obligation upon which the claim was based might have been payable in
installments, the last one of which was fifteen or twenty years after the date
of the obligation and therefore the statute of limitations would not begin
to run until the maturity of the last installment. Again, if a claimant should
die and an heir or legatee of such claimant was a minor or of unsound mind,
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the statute of limitations would not run while such heir or legatee continued
under disability. To remedy this situation, the Legislature in 1949 amended
said Section 195 so as to provide that all demands not filed within the time
provided in said Chapter 176 shall be forever barred, unless such creditor
shall find other estate of the deceased not inventoried or accounted for by
the executor or administrator, in which case his claim shall be paid pro rata
out of such subsequently discovered estate, provided, that such creditor shall
have filed his claim in the estate within six years from the death of the testator or intestate. The 1949 amendment contained a further provision that
if the testator or intestate died more than five years and six months before
the effective date of the 1949 amendment, creditors shall have the period of
six months (and no more) after the effective date of the 1949 amendment
within which to file their claims in the estate in order that they may be paid
out of such subsequently discovered estate. This amendment is 1949 S. L.
770-771, Sec. 17.
ESTATES-COMMENCED IN WRONG COUNTY. In 1949 the Legislature
passed a statute which provides that if the administration of any estate shall
have been commenced before the county court of a county which is not proper
under the provisions of 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 176, Sec. 71, and if the petition
filed therein supports the jurisdiction in which it is brought, such court shall
nevertheless have jurisdiction to proceed with and administer the estate, and
the legality and validity of the acts, proceedings and orders of such court
and of the acts of the personal representatives shall not be affected or questioned upon the ground that such administration is being or was had in the
wrong county. Such statute further provides that any person in interest
may, within thirty days after the passage of said statute, or within thirty
days after he is served with any notice in such estate proceedings, or within
thirty days after he is apprised of such estate proceedings, and not thereafter,
file a motion in such court to have the administration proceedings transferred
to the proper county. These provisions are by the statute made applicable
to estate proceedings commenced prior to its effective date as well as subsequent thereto. This statute is 1949 S. L. 767-768, Secs. 10 and 11.
ESTATES-FORECLOSURE OF DEEDS OF TRUST AGAINST. The statute
passed in 1905 (1905 S. L. 290) as amended by 1917 S. L. 391, 1935 C.S.A.
Ch. 176, Sec. 208, provided that no mortgage, deed of trust or other security
constituting a lien or encumbrance on any property owned by any person
at the date of his death or on the date of adjudication of mental incompetency
or which secures an indebtedness constituting a claim against the estate of
any decedent or mental incompetent shall be foreclosed except in accordance
with and under the conditions prescribed by such statute. One of such conditions was that such a deed of trust could not be foreclosed by sale by the
Public Trustee during the period of one year after the death or adjudication
unless the claim shall have been first proven and allowed or (if the amount
secured be not a claim against the estate) until the validity of the encum-
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brance and the amount secured thereby shall have been first duly proved in
the estate proceedings and permission given by the County Court for such
foreclosure by sale. Under this provision, even though the proceedings for
the foreclosure by sale by the Public Trustee of a deed of trust appeared
entirely valid and regular upon the face of the records in the office of the
Recorder and in the office of the Public Trustee, nevertheless the sale might
have been in violation of the provisions of such statute because of the person
owning the property having died or been declared incompetent, or the person primarily liable on the indebtedness secured thereby having died or been
adjudged incompetent, and the foreclosure sale having been made less than
a year after such death or adjudication of incompetency, and no permission
to foreclose by sale having been secured from the County Court. To be
assured that something like this might not have happened which would impair the validity of the foreclosure it would be necessary for the examining
attorney to ascertain whether the owner or any person primarily liable on
the indebtedness had died or been adjudged incompetent within a year prior
to the foreclosure sale and, if so, whether permission to foreclose by sale
had been given by the County Court. Therefore there were passed in 1931
four sections (1931 S. L. 793-794, Secs. 1-4; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs. 6568) which, as amended by 1939 S. L. 282-284 and 1945 S. L. 740-741, Sec. 9;
1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 40, Secs. 65-68 and Ch. 176, Sec. 208, provided:
that all Deeds of Trust, theretofore or thereafter executed to a Public Trustee, may be foreclosed by such Public Trustee in the usual manner, notwithstanding the fact that the indebtedness secured may constitute a claim against
the estate of a deceased person or a mental incompetent and notwithstanding
the death or mental incompetency of one or more of the owners of the real
estate covered by it; that such foreclosure shall be good against the mental
incompetent and against the heirs at law, legatees, devisees, creditors, conservators, guardians, executors and administrators of any decedent or mental
incompetent and all persons claiming by, through or under such decedent
or mental incompetent; that notice of the foreclosure proceedings shall be
given in the usual manner to the grantor in the Deed of Trust foreclosed
at the address stated therein as though living and mentally competent and
to all persons having interests then of record; that no notice of the foreclosure proceedings need be given to any heir at law, legatee, devisee, creditor, conservator, guardian, executor or administrator of the decedent or mental incompetent or to any person claiming by, through or under the decedent
or mental incompetent unless the claim or interest of such person then appears of record; that no deficiency claim oi judgment shall be made or allowed
against the estate of any incompetent person or decedent where the foreclosure sale of the encumbrance securing such indebtedness shall have been
made subsequent to the adjudication of mental incompetency of the incompetent person or subsequent to the death of the decedent, unless prior to
such foreclosure sale the claim upon the indebtedness secured by the encumbrance shall have been filed in such estate on or before the expiration of the
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period for creditors to file claims of the fifth class, and unless prior to such
foreclosure sale either such claim shall have been allowed in such estate or
permission to sell in such foreclosure shall have been granted by the Court
administering the estate; and that the interest and claim in and to the real
estate of all mental incompetents and all persons claiming by, through or
under the mental incompetent or decedent, including minors and mental
incompetents, shall be terminated and concluded by such foreclosure unless
they shall redeem within the time prescribed by law. The 1939 statute contained a limitation of one year after its effective date upon any action to
attack the validity of or set aside any Public Trustee's sale made prior to
said effective date or any Certificate of Sale or Trustee's Deed issued by any
Public Trustee upon such sale upon the ground that no court order permitting the foreclosure had been obtained in the estate.
ESTATES-SALES IN, NOT TO BE INVALIDATED. In 1949 there was passed
a statute providing that sales of real or personal property made by a personal
representative under the power conferred upon him by a will or under the
the provisions of Ch. 176, 1935 C.S.A. shall not be invalidated by any order
thereafter entered revoking, annulling or setting aside the order admitting
such will to probate or the order or letters of appointment of such personal
representative. This statute is 1949 S. L. 768, Sec. 14.
GIFT TAXES, LIEN OF. The Gift Tax Law passed in 1937 (1937 S. L.
611-612, Sec. 10(b)) provided that the gift tax shall be a lien upon the property embraced in gifts made during the calendar year for ten years from the
time the gift is made but that any part of the property (other than real property against which a statement of lien shall have been filed) embraced in the
gift which is sold by the donee to a bona fide purchaser for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth shall be released from such
lien. This made the question of whether real estate, which was the subject
of the gift and had been conveyed by the donee, was still subject to the lien
for the tax dependent upon whether the conveyance by the donee to the person who acquired it from him was pursuant to a sale of it and was for an
adequate and full consideration, and upon whether it was to a bona fide
purchaser. This rendered it difficult for an attorney to pass a title where
the records showed upon their face circumstances which indicated that a
gift may have been made of the property subsequent to the effective date
of the 1937 Act, such as the surnames of the grantor and grantee in the
deed being the same, the absence of revenue stamps or the statement in the
deed that the consideration was love and affection or that the deed was a
gift. Under such circumstances, the purchaser from either an immediate
or a remote grantee of the donee would be put upon inquiry to determine
whether the property was a gift and, if so, whether the gift tax had been
paid upon it or, in the alternative, whether the transfer of it by the donee
was upon a sale to a bona fide purchaser for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. Accordingly, this section was amended in
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1941 (1941 S. L. 453-454, 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 75A, Sec. 10(b) so that,
after stating the limitation of the lien for gift tax to ten years from the
time the gift was made, it limited such lien to property belonging to the
donor and to the donee. It provided that such lien shall not be valid as
against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser or judgment creditor until a statement of lien for the gift tax shall have been filed in the office of the Recorder
of the county wherein is located the property embraced in the gift, and that
the filing of such statement shall not affect the validity of any prior lien. The
1941 statute further provided that all liens which, prior to its adoption,
existed against any property under the provisions of the 1939 statute (which
amended the 1937 Gift Tax Law) shall, thirty days after the effective date
of the 1941 statute, cease to be valid against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser or judgment creditor. It is to be noted that the 1941 statute omits
all reference to the good faith of the purchaser or mortgagee and to the consideration for the purchase or mortgage and that it uses the words "any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser or judgment creditor".
HOMESTEADS. Previous to 1927 the statutes relating to the encumbering or conveying of property, upon the margin of the record title to which
an entry of homestead had been made (1921 Comp. Laws, Secs. 5924-5931)
required a rather complicated procedure including the husband and wife
joining in the execution of the same instrument and the wife voluntarily,
separate and apart from her husband, signing and acknowledging it, and the
officer taking the acknowledgment fully apprising her of her rights and the
effect of signing the instrument, and the acknowledgment to such instrument
expressly stating compliance with the foregoing. Occasionally it was found
that such a conveyance was signed by only one of the spouses and afterwards
a conveyance was signed by the other. More frequently it was found that
there was some technical insufficiency or omission in the certificate of acknowledgment so that such certificate of acknowledgment did not show an
exact compliance with the terms of the statute. Feeling that too much red
tape and technicality in the present day and age should not be thrown around
the conveyance or encumbrance of homesteaded property, and that all that
should be required for such conveyance or encumbrance should be such
signatures and acknowledgments as would be required if the two spouses
owned the property as tenants in common, there was passed in 1927 a statute
(1927 S. L. 952, Sec. 12, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 119) which provided
that to convey or encumber a homestead both husband and wife must execute a conveyance or encumbrance of their respective interests therein, and
that the same may be one instrument signed by both of them or by their
separate instruments, and that no special form of acknowledgment other than
the form provided to be used in other conveyances shall be necessary. Also,
previous to the passage of this act difficulty was sometimes encountered in
one or the other of the following circumstances: a person who, though unmarried, was nevertheless the head of a family and entitled to a homestead,
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owned the property and entered it as a homestead, in which case, when a
conveyance or encumbrance of the property was to be made, there was no
spouse to join in the execution of the instrument and there was no way
except by suit in which it could be established of record, even prima facie,
that the owner of the property was unmarried and that therefore it was
not necessary that his or her spouse also execute the instrument; and one of
two spouses owned the property and either of the spouses entered it as a
homestead and the spouse who was not the record owner died or was divorced,
in which case it was either impossible or exceedingly difficult to obtain the
signature of the former spouse who was not the record owner and, although
under the law, because of the death or divorce, the signature of such spouse
was not necessary to the validity of the conveyance or encumbrance, nevertheless it was difficult to show of record the death or divorce. To cover these
situations the said section in the 1927 law provided that, if the homestead
be claimed by a person who at the time of the conveyance or encumbrance
thereof be not married, a statement to that effect in such instrument shall
be prima facie evidence of such fact.
INHERITANCE TAX LIENS. As is stated in Title Standard No. 14, there
was, at the time of the adoption of said Standard, no period of limitation
whatsoever upon the lien of the Colorado Inheritance Tax upon real estate
owned by a decedent who died after April 17, 1909, as the statute provided
that the inheritance tax shall be and remain a lien upon the property passed
and transferred until paid. Consequently, extreme care had to be used by
the title examiner to see that a proper inheritance tax receipt or release had
been obtained which correctly described the real estate, title to which he was
examining. This necessitated examining the files in the county court to find
the inheritance tax receipt, if it had not been filed with the Recorder, even
in estates that were as much as thirty or thirty-five years old, and often it
was necessary to secure a new receipt because of an error in the description
of the property in the original receipt. In cases where the real estate
in question was not inventoried in the estate, an inheritance tax receipt or
release covering it had to be obtained because none had been secured during
the original administration proceedings, even though they had been commenced as far back as 1910. It was true that the statute contained an exception where the transfer was by deed or grant in the hands of a bona fide
purchaser or encumbrancer without notice; but, while this provision might
free from the lien property transferred by the decedent by way of gift in
contemplation of death when the property had been by the donee sold or
encumbered to a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer without notice, it could
have no effect to terminate the lien upon property which passed by descent
or devise. To remedy this situation, the Legislature enacted 1945 S. L. 394395 which imposed a limitation of fifteen years from date of death upon
the contihuance of the lien of the inheritance tax upon real property. And
in 1947 the Legislature made a further amendment which left intact the
limitation of the lien to fifteen years from date of death and provided that
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the inheritance tax lien on real property then existing on transfers from
decedents who died prior to May 16, 1933 shall cease to exist one year after
the effective date of the 1947 amendment (which effective date was April
14, 1947) unless within that period there is recorded in the county where
said real property is situate a notice of lien of inheritance tax describing the
real estate charged with the lien, the .name of the decedent from whom
the property passed and the amount of the tax claimed to be due, and
that such notice of lien should thereafter remain a valid lien against said
property for a period of one year from the date of the recording thereof
unless sooner released. This amendment is 1947 S. L. 538, Sec. 2, 1935
C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 85, Sec. 38. Therefore, if the decedent has been dead at
least fifteen years at the time of the examination of the title, the examiner
need not pay any attention to whether the inheritance tax has been paid.
JOINT TENANCY, CREATION OF.

As appears from what was said by our

Supreme Court in Eisenhardt v. Lowell, 105 Colo. 417, 424-425, 98 Pac.
(2d) 1001, the authorities are in conflict upon the question of whether a
joint tenancy can be created by a deed which purports to convey the property to the person named as the grantor and another person or other persons. The Court said that it was inclined to favor the view that a joint tenancy could so be created but added that, since it was unnecessary to a determination of the question there presented, it did not expressly so hold. Attorneys often encountered situations where a person who was the sole owner of
the real estate conveyed the property to himself and another person as joint
tenants and, because of the conflict of the decisions outside Colorado and
there being no Colorado decision settling the question, many attorneys rejected the title when derived through a deed executed by the grantee who
was not the original owner. Accordingly, the Legislature in 1939 enacted
a statute which expressly validated estates in joint tenancy whether in a
grant, devise or conveyance thereafter made from one person to others, or
from one person to himself and another or others, or from tenants in common to themselves or to themselves and another or others, or from joint
tenants to themselves and another or others (1939 S. L. 285, 1935 C.S.A.
Suppl. Ch. 40, Sec. 4). Title Standard No. 61, which was promulgated
May 20, 1949, states that a conveyance made prior to the effective date of
the 1939 statute creates a joint tenancy if it is sufficient in form to create
a joint tenancy pursuant to the 1939 statute.
JOINT TENANCY NOT TO BE AFFECTED BY WILL OR CODICIL.

Colorado

attorneys were startled in 1938 to learn that in Estate of Liden (Hauser v.
Foster), 103 Colo. 58, 65, 82 Pac. (2d) 775, our Supreme Court had held
that an instrument creating a joint tenancy speaks as of the time of the execution of that instrument and that a will speaks as of the time of death, and
that therefore it must follow that, if a will creates a situation inconsistent
with a joint tenancy, the will must control and that, since one of the joint
tenants died leaving a will which gave the residue of his estate to a person
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other than the surviving joint tenant, the will was clearly inconsistent with
survivorship so that, as to his estate, the will was controlling and on his
death his interest in the property passed not to the surviving joint tenant
but to the residuary legatee and devisee. The Court, as supporting this
conclusion, cited Walker v. Drogmund, 101 Colo. 521, 74 Pac. (2d) 1235,
although in that case the Court, on page 529, said that the right of a survivor is preferred above any devise or testamentary conveyance which the
decedent can make, and that any attempt to devise property affected by
survivorship is inconsistent with such status. This language used in Walker
v. Drogmund was in accordance with the understanding of the attorneys as
to what was the law. The decision in Estate of Liden resulted in a chaotic
condition because, if an attorney passed a title derived through a conveyance by the surviving joint tenant, he had no assurance that there might not
already have been admitted to probate, or might not thereafter be admitted
to probate, in some one of the sixty-three counties in Colorado a will of the
deceased joint tenant which contained a specific or residuary devise to someone other than the surviving joint tenant, by reason of which the decision
in Estate of Liden would require a holding that the deed from the surviving
joint tenant did not convey the entire title to the property but only the
fractional interest therein which the surviving joint tenant held immediately
before the death of the decedent. Therefore, at the next session of the Legislature there was passed 1939 S. L. 287-288, 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 92,
Secs. 18-20, which provided that no will, codicil or other testamentary disposition or testamentary provision of one of the owners in joint tenancy of
real estate shall destroy or affect the joint tenancy or prevent the entire title
and interest owned by the joint tenants from becoming vested upon his death
in the joint tenant or joint tenants who shall have survived him and that,
upon such death, all of the interest and title which, immediately before such
death, was owned by all of the joint tenants shall become vested in the survivor or survivors of such joint tenants in spite of and without regard to the
provisions of a will or codicil of the joint tenant so dying or the admission to
probate of same, and without regard to whether such will or codicil was executed before or after the creation of the joint tenancy. This statute further
provided that it shall be conclusively presumed that no will, codicil or other
testamentary disposition or testamentary provision of one of the owners in
joint tenancy of real estate who shall have died prior to the effective date of
the 1939 statute has destroyed or affected the joint tenancy or prevented the
entire title and interest owned by the joint tenants from becoming vested upon
his death in the joint tenant or joint tenants who survived him, unless an action to assert or establish the contrary shall have been brought prior to the
expiration of six months from the effective date of the 1939 statute, and unless
also a lis pendens stating that such action has been commenced shall have
been filed for record within said six months in the office of the Recorder of
the county in which the property so owned in joint tenancy is situate.
JUDGMENTS.

See Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds.
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LIEN NOTES. There has been a practice on the part of certain firms and

companies of having the property owner sign a short instrument constituting
in effect both a promissory note and a mortgage upon real property. In most
cases these instruments were executed to roofing companies and in them the
property owner agreed to pay the roofing company a certain amount in
certain installments for a new roof or for roofing repairs and gave to the
roofing company a lien upon the property for the payment of same. These
instruments were acknowledged in the same manner as other instruments
affecting title to real estate and were then recorded. Usually before these
instruments were recorded they were discounted by the roofing company to
a finance company and in such cases the recorded copy of the lien note
showed an endorsement from the roofing company to the finance company
on the back of the instrument. These endorsements were never acknowledged.
Later, upon payment of the indebtedness, the finance company would execute and acknowledge a quit claim deed purporting to operate as a release
of the lien note. However, since the lien note was, in law and in fact, a mortgage upon real estate, an endorsement or assignment thereof was in effect
an assignment of a mortgage on real estate and such assignment could not
be accepted as showing of record the assignment of the mortgage unless
it was acknowledged. So that, since the assignment was only by endorsement and was not acknowledged, the endorsement was not prima facie evidence of the assignment and so the later quit claim by the endorsee could
not be accepted as releasing the lien note. And very often, when attempts
were made to locate the roofing company in order to secure a release from
it, it was found that it had folded up and the officers or partners thereof
could not be found. In order to remedy this condition a statute was passed
in 1937 (1937 S. L. 479-480, Sec. 2, 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 40, Sec. 107 (1))
which provided where an instrument, which by its terms constitutes a promise
or obligation for the payment of money, and also by its terms creates a lien
on real estate as security for the payment thereof, shall at the time it shall
have been recorded (whether such recording be the original recording or
a recording subsequent to the original one) have borne upon its face or
upon its back an assignment, transfer or endorsement thereof, such instru,
ment and such assignment, transfer or endorsement, or the recorded copy
thereof, or a certified copy of the recorded copy thereof, shall be admissible
in evidence as and constitute prima facie evidence of such transfer, assignment or endorsement of such instrument from the person whose purported
signature is affixed thereto to the person named therein, irrespective of
whether such assignment, transfer or endorsement shall have been acknowledged in the manner provided by law for the acknowledgment of instruments relating to or affecting title to real property, or acknowledged at all.
Such section furtber provided it should be applicable to all of such instruments which shall have been executed prior to the time when such section
took effect, as well as to all such instruments which are executed after the
time when the section took effect.
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LIENS-EXTINGUISHMENT OF. Occasionally there appears in the abstract a deed of trust or mortgage executed forty or fifty years prior to the
time of examination, with no release thereof or foreclosure thereof shown
by the records. No doubt in many cases this was due to the owner of the
property having paid the indebtedness secured by the encumbrance but having omitted to secure and record a release or, having secured the release,
having omitted to record it, or to the cwner having conveyed the property
to the holder of the encumbrance and the latter having neglected to have
his encumbrance released of record. It had been held by the Colorado Supreme Court that no statute of limitations bars foreclosure of a Deed of
Trust by sale under the power contained therein, but that foreclosure sale
under the Deed of Trust can be made no matter how long it may be made
after the maturity of the indebtedness. Holmquist v. Gilbert, 41 Colo. 113, 92
Pac. 232; Foot v. Bu-rr, 41 Colo. 192, 92 Pac. 236; Brereton v. Benedict,.
41 Colo. 16, 92 Pac. 238; Walters v. Webster, 52 Colo. 549, 123 Pac. 952;
Rowe v. Mulvane, 25 Colo. App. 502, 139 Pac. 1041. It had also been held
by our Supreme Court in Folda Real Estate Co. v. Jacobsen, 75 Colo. 16,
223 Pac. 748 that, although an action upon a promissory note may be barred
by the statute of limitations, nevertheless an action to foreclose a mortgage
securing such note is not barred by the statute of limitations. See also Birkby
v. Wilson, 92 Colo. 281, 285, 19 Pac. (2d) 490. Feeling that there should
be some way of clearing off these old encumbrances which apparently had
been forgotten long ago by all persons connected therewith, there were passed
in 1927 a number of sections (1927 S. L. 593-598, Secs. 16-29) which in
substance provided: that no lien upon real property created by mortgage,
trust deed or other instrument securing the payment of an indebtedness
shall remain a lien for a period longer than seven years after the final payment of principal is due and payable as shown by the recorded instrument
and that such instrument shall cease to be a lien and the record thereof
shall cease to be notice after such seven years unless it be extended and the
lien and notice thereof renewed and continued by the recording during such
seven years of an instrument signed by the beneficiary or by the owner of
the indebtedness secured, clearly describing the mortgage, trust deed or other
instrument and setting forth the date to which the payment of the indebtedness has been extended; that, if such extension be recorded within
such seven years, the original instrument creating the lien shall continue
and be in full force and effect for the further period of seven years from
the date when the final payment of principal becomes due and payable as
set forth in said extension, with the right to make similar successive renewals
or extensions of the lien, provided, however, that the original extension and
all additional and further extensions shall, in no event, extend the lien of
the original mortgage, trust deed or other instrument beyond a total of
thirty years. Such sections further contained provisions to the effect that
instruments creating liens as security for indebtedness which were of record
at the time the sections went into effect and in which the final payment therein
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provided was then past due shall, for the purpose of such sections, be considered as having become due at the time the sections went into effect and
that the time for payment may be extended within seven years thereafter
in conformity with the provisions of such. sections and, if not so extended,
such instruments shall, seven years after the sections went into effect, cease
to constitute notice for any purpose and thereafter purchasers or encumbrancers shall not be bound thereby. Such sections further provided that if,
prior to the expiration of the period, as defined in such sections, during
which any such instrument creating a lien shall constitute notice, there shall
be filed in the office of the Recorder of the proper county a notice of an
action pending to foreclose such lien or a notice of foreclosure proceedings
thereon by a Public Trustee or other proper official, then the lien created by
such instrument shall not terminate and the notice granted by the recording
thereof shall continue until final disposition of the action or foreclosure
proceeding. Such sections contained other provisions to carry out the general purpose herein shown. Our Supreme Court in Birkby v. Wilson, 9.2
Colo. 281, 19 Pac. (2d) 490 held that, under these sections, a mortgagee
was not barred from instituting a suit to foreclose a mortgage securing a
note due December 1, 1924 until March 28, 1934 (the end of the original
seven years from the effective date of 1927 Act), and then only in the
event that the lien of the mortgage and the indebtedness have not been kept
alive pursuant to the provisions of these sections. The Legislature in 1933
(1933 S. L. 798-802) amended the 1927 sections so as to change the words
"seven years" wherever they appeared to "fifteen years," thereby postponing
from March 28, 1934 to March 28, 1942 the time when the limitations in
the 1927 Act should be effective. The provisions of the 1927 Act as amended
by the 1933 Act are 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs. 122 to 135. Title Standard
No. 49 is based upon these sections.
LIMITATIONS-LIEN BARRED WHEN INDEBTEDNESS Is BARRED. As was
stated in Birkby v. Wilson, 92 Colo. 281, 285, 19 Pac. (2d) 490, our
Supreme Court held in Folda Real Estate Co. v. Jacobsen, 75 Colo. 16, 223
Pac. 748 that foreclosure by suit of a mortgage on real estate is not barred
although an action upon the note secured by such mortgage is barred by the
statute of limitations. The effect of this decision was apparently to enable
a mortgage on real estate to be foreclosed no matter how long a period may
have elapsed after the maturity of the indebtedness secured thereby and
even though there had not been any partial payment, new promise or acknowledgment that would waive the bar of the statute of limitations as
against a suit on the indebtedness. Because of this there was passed in
1927 a statute (1927 S. L. 598, Sec. 27, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 133) which
provides that the lien created by any instrument shall be extinguished at
the same time that the right to commence a suit to enforce payment of the
indebtedness secured by the lien is barred by any statute of limitation of this
state. This section was discussed in Birkby v. Wilson, supra.
(Mr. Morris will conclude his article in the December issue.)
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The Federal Common Law
By

JOHN

W.

NEWMAN, JR.

of the Nebraska Bar*

The purpose of this paper will be to point out some of the fields of law
wherein the courts may still apply a federal common law since the case of
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins ' was decided in 1938. This paper will not
purport to deal with the other types of law applicable in the federal courts
but will confine itself to the narrow issue of when federal common law will
be applied.
It is impossible to begin any consideration of what is left of the federal
common law without discussing the Erie case, in which case Mr. Justice
Brandeis uttered his famous dictum that "there is no federal general common
law". 2 That Justice Brandeis intended this statement to be read in the light
of his whole opinion is clear not only from an examination of the entire pronouncement, but also from his own opinion in another case 3 decided the
same day. In this latter case he stated, "For whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two states is a question of
'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of
either state can be conclusive". 4 From this statement, it becomes immediately
apparent that there will be at least some room for the application of the
federal common law to the exclusion of the common law as determined by
the state courts.
For a while after the decision in the Erie case, there was much uncertainty as to the fields in which federal common law could operate. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court since 1938 have not removed all
doubts upon this question; however, there does seem to have unfolded a fairly
consistent pattern for the application of federal common law in specific types
"exceptions" to the Erie case,
of cases. These cases, as we will see, are not
5
but rather are outside the scope of that case.
error.

In the Erie case, where the court was dealing with a state created right,6
it was said, "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.
And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern." 7
Thus, the court in effect said that state law, whether statutory or state de* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
1304 U. S. 64 (1938).

'Id. at 78.
Hinderlider v. LaPlatta River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92 (1938).
'Id. at 110.
'See note, 59 Harvard Law Review 966 (1946), which seemingly calls into this
' Tompkins brought an action against the Erie Railroad for personal injuries caused
by the alleged negligence of the defendant in the state of Pennsylvania.
' Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, supra at 78.
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cisional law, must be applied in the federal courts whenever a state created
right is involved, whatever may be the basis of jurisdiction. This left room
for the application of federal law, whether statutory or federal common law,
by the federal courts wherever a federally created right is involved, whatever
may be the basis of jurisdiction.
In other words, whether the federal court is bound to apply the law as
interpreted by the courts of a state under authority of the Erie case will
depend, not upon the basis of jurisdiction-diversity or federal question-but
rather upon the nature of the right involved, i.e., state created or federally
created. s This construction is, of course, in keeping with the reason behind
the Erie decision (the need for uniformity of decision between the federal and
state courts) in that the uniformity is not limited to cases of diversity only.
What are these federally created rights which are outside the scope of
the Erie case and to which the federal common law may be applied? These
rights arise in cases which can be generally classified into three categories: first,
where the United States is a party to the action as a result of contract or
otherwise; second, where the right is within the sweep of a federal statute;
and third, where Congress has "occupied the field" wherein the right arises.
Each of these categories will be discussed separately.
Federally Created Rights Where the United States is a Party
It should be noted here that if it is correct to say that the Erie doctrine
is limited to cases where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship (as is -often, and it is believed fallaciously, assumed), then this line
of cases can be explained on that ground alone because jurisdiction here rests
on the fact that the United States is a party. However, it seems better to say
that this line of cases involves federally created rights and thus falls outside
the application of the Erie rule.
A typical case falling into this group is Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
StatesY In that case there was involved a check drawn upon the Treasurer of
the United States payable to one Barner for WPA services rendered by him.
This check was dated April 28, 1936, and although placed in the mail addressed to Barner, it was intercepted by some unknown person who forged the
payee's name and cashed it at the store of the J. C. Penney Co. in Clearfield,
Pennsylvania, which paid value in good faith. The J. C. Penney Co. endorsed
the check to the Clearfield Trust Co., which collected it from the United
States through the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Shortly after this,
Barner notified his WPA foreman that he had not received the check.
It was not until January 12, 1937, however, that notice was given to the
Clearfield Trust Co. of the alleged forgery, and not until August 31, 1937
8 See Snepp, "The Law Applied in the Federal Courts," 13 Law and Contemporary
Problems 165, 168-169 (1948), as to the fallacy of limiting the Erie doctrine to diver-

sity cases.

318 U. S. 363 (1943).
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was it notified that the United States was asking reimbursement upon the check.
Suit was brought by the United States against the Clearfield Trust Co. on
November 16, 1939, and the J. C. Penney Co. subsequently intervened.
The federal district court applied Pennsylvania law and held for the trust
company. The circuit court reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed in
favor of the United States. The court held that the Erie case was inapplicable
not because this was a non-diversity case, but because "the rights and duties
of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by
federal rather than local law ...The authority to issue the check had its origin
in the Constitution and the statutes of the United States 10 and was in no
way dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania or of any other state .. .The
duties imposed upon the United States and the rights acquired by it as a
result of the issuance find their roots in the same federal sources . . . In
absence of an applicable Act of Congress, it is for the federal courts to
fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.""
Another case of this type is United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California. 12 In this case a soldier of the United States was injured by a motor
truck through the negligence of the driver. The expenses of his hospitalization
were borne by the United States, and he continued to receive his army pay
during the period of his disability. The United States brought suit in a federal district court against the owner and driver of the truck as tortfeasors to
recover the amounts expended for hospitalization and the soldier's pay during
the period of disability. The court held (as in the Clearfield case) that the
Erie case was inapplicable and that federal law governed because "not only is
the government-soldier relationship distinctively and exclusively a creation of
federal law 13 but we know of no good reason why the Government's right
to be indemnified in these circumstances, or lack of such right, should vary
in accordance with the rulings of the several states, simply because the soldier
marches or, today perhaps as often, flies across state lines". 14 In other words,
the right was federally created, and the federal common law applied even
though Congress had not acted affirmatively concerning the specific question.
A third case that falls within this group is Board of Commissioners v.
United States.'5 . This was an action brought by the United States in behalf
of one of its Indian wards for taxes unlawfully paid. A treaty between the
United States and the Pottawatomie Indians in 1861 had provided that lands
held by the United States in trust for the Pottawatomie Indians were exempt
from taxation. The lands in question were so held in trust, but the Secretary
of the Interior had cancelled the Indian ward's trust patent in 1918 and
issued a fee simple patent. As a result, Jackson County, Kansas began to
"Italics

are added.

Glearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
C

U.S. 363, 366 (1943).

"332 U. S. 301 (1947).

are added.
"Italics
"United States v.Standard Oil of Calif., 332 U. S.301, 310 (1947).
" 308 U. S. 343 (1939).
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subject the lands to its regular property taxes. Later Congress authorized the
cancellation of such fee simple patents, and the United States commenced this
action to recover for its Indian ward the taxes paid to Jackson County. The
county urged that the Erie case bound the court to follow the Kansas law.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, said, "Since the origin of the
right 16 to be enforced is the Treaty, plainly whatever rule we fashion is
ultimately attributable to the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United
States and does not owe its authority to the lawmaking agencies of Kansas." 17
Again the Court chose to distinguish the Erie doctrine on the basis that a
federally created right was involved rather than upon the mere fact that this
was not a diversity case.
From the language of the Court in the above mentioned cases, it becomes
evident that the Court has not chosen to rest its decisions on the somewhat
narrow ground that the basis of jurisdiction in the federal court was not
diversity of citizenship. The Court looks, rather, to the origin of the right
which is sought to be enforced.
Where Rights Are Within The Sweep of a Federal Statute
There has never been any question as to whether state or federal law
would be applied when the right involved was a direct and express creation
of a federal statute. The more difficult problems arise where federal statutes
fail to define certain rights which are, nevertheless, implied in the policy of
the statutes. This type of situation is illustrated in the early post-Erie case of
Deitrick v. Greaney 18 wherein an action was brought by a receiver of a national banking association to compel payment of a promissory note. The Court
refused to accept a defense on the note raised by the defendant which was
based on local law. The Court brushed aside the Erie argument by stating and
thus deciding: "But it is the federal statute which condemns as unlawful respondent's acts. The extent and nature of the legal consequences of this condemnation, though left by statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless
to be derived from it and the federal policy which it has adopted". 19
In the case of D'Oench, Duhme and Co. v. FDIC,20 the facts involved a suit by the FDIC on a note given to a bank by the defendant.
The defendant had a secret agreement with the bank that the note would not
be enforced. The defenses on the note were lack of consideration because of
the agreement and that the FDIC was not a holder in due course. The
majority decided the case in favor of the FDIC on the basis of federal law,
relying on the analogy of Deitrick v. Greaney. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring,
said, "I do not understand Justice Bandeis' statement in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 at 78, that 'There is no federal general common law', to
" Italics are added.

"Board of Commissioners v. U. S., 308 U. S. 343, 349 (1939).
18309 U.

S. 190 (1940).

, 8 Id. at 200.
2°315 U. S. 447 (1942).
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deny that the common law may in proper cases be an aid to, or the basis of,
decision of federal questions."

21

He then said:

"Federal law is no juridical chameleon, changing complexion to
match that of each state wherein lawsuits happen to be commenced because of the accidents of service and of the application of the venue
statutes. It is found in the federal Constitution, statutes, or common
law. Federal common law implements the Federal Constitution and
statutes and is conditioned by them. Within these limits, federal
courts are free to apply the traditional common-law technique of decision and to draw upon all the sources of the common law in cases
22
such as the present."
It should be noticed that in these cases the federal statute does not
specifically cover the matter in question. Neverthless, the court has treated
the rights as being federally created because the cases arise under laws of
the United States. As Mr. Justice Jackson said, concurring in the D'Oench
case, "Although by Congressional command this case is to be deemed one
arising under the laws of the United States, no federal statute purports to
dr,6ne the Corporation's rights as a holder of the note in suit, or the liability
ot .'e maker thereof". 23 That is the reason the cases have been classified as
falling "within the sweep" of the federal statute rather than directly under
the statute.
Federally Created Rights Where Congress Has Occupied the Field
Into the third category will fall those rights which might well have been
found to be state created rights had it not been for the fact that by the enactment of a more or less comprehensive statute within the field, Congress has
given expression to its desire to bring about uniformity in a particular branch
of the law and to bring particular matters within the purview of federal, rather
than state, influence. Examples of this third category will likely be found
most frequently in the field of regulation of interstate commerce as Congress
exerts its influence into new fields of activity.
In O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph Company,2 4 a defamatory mes-

sage concerning the plaintiff was transmitted by the defendant from a point in
Massachusetts to a point in Michigan. In the libel suit in the Massachusetts
federal court there was a jury verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff excepted
to the refusal of the trial court to rule as a matter of law that the transmission
was not privileged. Neither Massachusetts nor Michigan courts had decided
whether a telegraph company had such a privilege, but the Communications
Act of 1934 had provided: "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to
make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in services . . ." 25 The court
n22 Id. at 469.
Id. at 471
22 Id. at 472.
24

113 F(2d) 539 (1940).

: 37 U. S. C. sec. 202(a).
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held that neither the Michigan nor Massachusetts law would be binding,
since the telegram was an interstate message and the telegraph company an
interstate carrier subject to the federal act. The court said:
"Congress having occupied the field 2G by enacting a fairly comprehensive scheme of regulation, it seems clear that questions relating
to the duties, privileges and liabilities of telegraph companies in the
transmission of interstate messages must be governed by uniform federal rules. . . Notwithstanding Erie Railroad Co. v. TomPkins there
still exist certain fields-and this is one-where legal relations are governed by a 'federal common law', a body of decisional law developed
27
by the federal courts untrammeled by state court decisions."1
The latest case of this group is Francis v. Southern Pacific Co. 28 Here

the suit was brought by guardians of minor children to recover damages
from the railroad for the death of the father, who was killed while riding on
a train of the defendant. Jurisdiction was founded on diversity. The deceased
had been riding on a free pass which provided by its terms that the user
assumed all risk of injury to person or property whether by negligence or
otherwise, and the user absolved the issuing company from liability therefor.
Under the applicable local law (Utah), recovery is permitted against a railroad when its negligence was responsible for a passenger's death, whether the
passenger rides on a free pass containing at attempted waiver of liability for
negligence or pays his fare in money. The Hepburn Act,2 however, one of
the various statutes regulating interstate commerce, deals with "free passes"
on interstate carriers. As early as 1904, even before the Hepburn Act, the
Supreme Court had held that a provision in a free pass similar to the one
in the instant case absolved the railroad from liability caused by ordinary
negligence.30 The Hepburn Act was passed in 1906 and limited the cases in
which free passes could be issued, and after that act the course of decisions
remained consistent with the Adams case.3 1 In 1940 the statutes dealing with
railroads were revamped and the free pass provisions were modified only to
permit free transportation to additional classes of persons-no changes were
made in the established judicial interpretation. In view of this history, the
court determined that the issuance of free passes and the judicial determination of their legal effect was a federal matter to the exclusion of the state law
and Erie had no application. In other words, the Court felt that the provision
for passes in the act, with its sanction in penalties, was a "regulation of interstate commerce to the completion of which the determination of the effect
of the passes is necessary".a 2 The Court felt that Congress, through the act,
" Italics are added.
" 113 F(2d) 539, 541 (1940).
23333 U. S. 445 (1948).
49 U. S. C. Sec. 1 (1940).

"0Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Adams, 192 U. S. 440 (1904).
Ibid.
' 333 U. S. 445, 449 (1948).
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had decreed this to be a federal problem which should be governed by federal,
rather than state, law. This case thus goes far in saying that such a right is
federally created, but it is a good example of the expansion of the "federal
fields" doctrine by the ever stretching idea of what constitutes a federally
created right.
The cases which have been referred to in the course of this paper are by
no means the only cases that have been decided since Erie v. Tompkins wherein
the court still felt free to apply federal common law. However, they are
sufficient to illustrate the realization on the part of the Supreme Court that
some degree of uniformity in the application of national law is necessary for
a workable federal system. That is not to say that diversity of laws should
not be permitted between states on matters which are clearly within the
scope of state regulation. But on matters which are, under our Constitution,
placed under the control of the national government, national uniformity is
necessary. Decisional or common law is everywhere relied on in legal systems
founded upon Anglo-American law, and federal common law is a constantly
expanding body of law in our judicial system today.

The Book Trader's Corner
O'Rourke and Kempf of Montrose are anxious to trade their duplicate
volumes of Colorado reports. They have extra copies of volumes 68 to 72,
and 75 to 90, and are in need of Court of Appeals volumes 11, 21 and 22
and Colorado reports 95 to 104.
Anyone wishing to sell a full set of Board of Tax Appeal reports should
contact the secretary, 319 Chamber of Commerce Bldg., Denver.
Marion Porter, who still maintains his membership in the Colorado Bar
Association although he is practicing in Billings, Mont., is interested in outfitting a whole new library with Pacific reporters, Pacific 2nd, C.J., C.J.S., or
Am. Jur., Montana reports, ALRs, Hillyer or Bancroft on Pleading and
Practice, and California jurisprudence books.

Midwestern Association Names New Officers
At its annual meeting on September 24, the Midwestern Colorado Bar
Association elected Charles S. Thomas of Paonia, president, Jack Hughes of
Montrose, vice president, and W. G. Waldeck of Montrose, secretary-treasurer.
Two members of the Denver bar, Judge Joseph J. Walsh and former Supreme
Court Justice R. Hickman Walker, were guest speakers for the meeting held
this year at Paonia.

New Otero-Crowley Officers
Officers of the Otero-Crowley Bar Association for the current year are:
Cover Mendenhall of Rocky Ford, president; George L. Strain of La Junta,
vice-president; and Robert A. Trainor of Ordway, secretary-treasurer.
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How The Statute of Uses Became Operative in

Colorado With a "Telling" Effect
THOMAS

K.

SCALLEN*

Henry Moore Teller, a young member of the Illinois Bar arrived in
Colorado Territory in April of 1861, settling at Central City in Gilpin
county which was then affectionately referred to as the "Little Kingdom of
Gilpin." Mining was the leading industry and a gold-mine stock boom in the
winter of 1863 and spring of 1864 made Central City a center of commerce.
Willard Teller soon joined his older brother and the two erected the
Teller House at Central City, where the celebrated "Face on the Barroom
Floor" may still be seen. Henry Teller was elected to the Senate of the United
States in 1876 and was later Secretary of the Interior under President Arthur,
while Willard Teller developed the extensive practice of the Teller law firm.
In 1897, Willard Teller was retained by Samuel B. Morgan to prosecute
and argue an appeal from an action of ejectment brought in the Federal
circuit court for the district of Colorado by the City of Denver and Platt
Rogers, as mayor. The defendant, Morgan, traced his title to, and relied upon,
a patent from the United States granting t6 Joseph E. Bates, former mayor
of the City of Denver, and to his successors and assigns forever, lands decribed, including the land in controversy, in trust for the City of Denver.
The circuit court had sustained a demurrer to the defendant Morgan's answer
setting up such chain of title.
Morgan v. Rogers et al.,' came on before the Circuit Court of Appeals
of the Eighth Circuit. Willard Teller, appearing for the plaintiff in error,
argued that the Statute of Uses (27 Hen. VIII, c. 10) was part of the common
law of Colorado, that the use was executed on the delivery of the patent, and
that thus both the legal and equitable title to the property passed at once to,
and vested in, the City of Denver, as the cestui que use. Teller's argument
was successful and the judgment was reversed. This was the first case on
appeal to invoke the Statute of Uses in Colorado. If any lawyer in Colorado
should have good reason to remember the Statute of Uses, Willard Teller was
that lawyer, and thereby hangs a tale.
Somewhat earlier, in 1887, Ellen R. Seymour and W. G. Pell, owners of
certain mining property conveyed the same to the Slide and Spur Gold Mines
Company (Limited). In 1889, the company having defaulted in the payment of the purchase price of the property, the vendors, Seymour and Pell,
sued in the United States circuit court for the district of Colorado to have
decreed a vendor's lien upon the property sold, and in July, 1890, obtained
a decree establishing their lien. In September, 1894, the master in chancery
sold the property under the decree. On May 11, 1895 he gave a deed which
* Student at the University of Denver College of Law.
Morgan v. Rogers et al.. 79 Fed. 577, Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit,
(1897); error dismissed, 173 U. S. 702, 19 S. Ct. 879, 43 L. Ed. 1185, (1899).
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recited that the complainants were allowed in and by the terms of the decree
to bid for the property at the sale up to the amount of the decree without
paying cash except sufficient to pay costs, and that thereupon Willard Teller
bid for the said complainants, in his name for the use of the complainants,, and
that being the highest bidder, the property was sold to him. The deed then
recited:
"Now therefore I, Adolphus Capron, master in chancery aforesaid, do by these presents grant, bargain, sell and convey unto said Willard Teller, trustee, and to his heirs and assigns forever the said real
estate * * * to have and to hold to the said Willard Teller, trustee,
for his heirs and assigns forever."
Why title was taken by Willard Teller as trustee for Seymour and Pell
was soon apparent when three days after the deed was recorded, May 13,
1895, David Hill recovered a judgment against Seymour and Pell et al., and
a transcript thereof was filed in the office of the clerk of the county of Boulder
wherein the property was situate. In April, 1895, Hill sued to subject the
mining property held by Teller, trustee, to the judgment of Hill and to have
his judgment declared a prior lien to any claim of Teller. Hill received a
judgment awarding the relief prayed for and Teller appealed. Willard Teller
was represented in his appeal by his elder brother, Senator Henry M. Teller
(who had also been his partner when Morgan v. Rogers, supra, was decided)
and by the youngest brother, James H. Teller.
Hill's position was that the Statute of Uses executed the legal estate conveyed to Teller and united both the legal and equitable estate in Seymour and
Pell. The estate thus created, Hill contended, was subject by operation of law
to a lien in Hill and such lien was superior to any secret lien between Teller
and the benficiaries under the master's deed.
Teller denied that the Statute of Uses was in force in Colorado! He also
contended that if it was, the statute did not operate, as the trust was an
active one, and further that the firm of Teller & Orahood had an attorney's
lien upon the estate created by the master, superior to the lien created by
.Hill's transcript of judgment.
The Colorado Supreme Court held, Teller v. Hill,2 that the trust was a
passive one, upon which the Statute of Uses would operate and that a judgment lien was superior to an attorney's lien in favor of the trustee of which
the judgment creditor had no notice. As to the crucial issue of whether the
Statute of Uses was in force in Colorado, the court simply said:
"That the Statute of Uses was one of the statutes so adopted by
this commonwealth, was ruled in Morgan v. Rogers (Cir. Ct. App.,
8 Cir.), 79 Fed. 577. No authority is cited to the contrary."
t
Teller v. Hill, 18 Colo. App. 509, 72 Pac. 811 (1903). The rule of law laid down
in this case is now subject to the qualification imposed by statute (C.S.A., 1935, c. 40,

sec. 9) requiring (1) a designation of the beneficiary and (2) that the trust either be
defined or that there be a reference to some instrument of record which recites the terms
of the trust.
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Letters to the Editor
Mr. Metzger's Comma

The transitional disappearance of a comma between House and Senate
during the period of gestation of House Bill No. 154 seems to have caused some
uncertainty in the mind of the Attorney General as to what may have been the
legislative intent with or without this comma.
It is gratifying to know that, in his opinion, the absence of the comma
in the enrolled bill, does not seriously affect the legislative intent.
May I suggest the probability that the comma went out to take a drink
during the transitional period and failed to reappear when he should have
been enrolled.
E. B. ADAMS,
Grand Junction.
More On John G. Johnson

In reference to Mr. McAllister's article in the June DICTA on the great
lawyer John G. Johnson, the late John Ewing of the Colorado bar told me
of an occasion when he was present in the U. S. Supreme Court where
Johnson was representing an appellee. Before the appellant's counsel began
to speak, Johnson arose apologetically and told the court he was compelled
to be in New York that afternoon; that he had spoken to opposing counsel
and it was agreeable with them, if it was with the court, for him to state his
views first, and then catch his train. This was not done in any arrogant manner, as though implying contempt for his opponents or their case, but simply
that he felt he could present his contentions for what they were worth and
then leave, without inconvenience to court or counsel. The court consented;
a very important question was involved; and the later decision adopted
Johnson's contention.
FRAZER ARNOLD,
Denver.

New Southeastern Bar Association Officers
At an election on September 21, J. Woodson Railey of Lamar was
designated president of the Southeastern Colorado Bar Association, and
Ray A. Gunning, also of Lamar, was elected secretary-treasurer.
William L. Branch and Robert A. Lauterbach, who restrict their practice
to tax matters, have moved their offices from the E & C Bldg. to the Majestic
Bldg., Denver.

